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UPDATING THE DETERRENCE
DOCTRINE*
J.L. MILLER**

ANDY B. ANDERSON***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Common sense can explain the deterrence doctrine: most individuals prefer to avoid prison and thus are discouraged from engaging in criminal behavior, especially that behavior likely to be
detected and punished. Even citizens alarmed by the amount of
crime committed in the United States must acknowledge that the
threat of punishment deters most individuals, most of the time.
The practical problem facing contemporary deterrence researchers, law makers and other social policy makers is to develop
the correct "formula" for using the threat of punishment to deter
those individuals who are relatively resistant to legal threats, i.e.,
those individuals who commit common or predatory crime. One
commentator has aptly phrased this problem by stating: "The crucial question is not simply whether negative sanctions deter, but
rather under what conditions are negative sanctions likely to be
effective."'
Commentators, with some exceptions, 2 criticize the deterrence
research literature as being largely "atheoretical and divorced from
a body of ideas that predicts the conditions under which legal
* This research was supported by the National Institute of Justice, Grant #81-IJCX-0046. We acknowledge the contributions made to this study by Anthony R. Harris,
Marianne Geronimo Jaffee, and Eleanor Weber-Burdin. Members of the Sorrento
Seminar andJohnJ. Sloan, III made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Purdue University. Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, 1984; M.A., College of William and Mary,

1980; B.A., Keene State College, 1978.
*** Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Massachusetts. Ph.D., Tulane
University, 1967; B.A., Southern Methodist University, 1963.
I Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 Soc. PROBS. 409, 411 (1969).
Notable exceptions include the following: C.R. TrrrLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL
DEvIANCE (1980); Minor, A Deterrence-ControlTheory of Crime, in THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY
2

117-38 (R. Meier ed. 1977).
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threats inhibit criminality." 3 Most recently, theoretical attempts to
re-conceptualize the deterrence principle have focused on subsuming the principle within more general social control perspectives. 4 Such attempts lead to the inevitable conclusion that
extralegal factors are just as important as legal threats to control
criminal or deviant behavior. Of course, these insights have little
value for law and policy makers who can only use legal threats as a
mechanism of crime control. What is still clearly needed from the
social science community is an adequate explanation for how legal
threats can be used effectively to control crime.
The intent of this paper is to bring general deterrence research 5
closer to theory regarding how the threat of punishment regulates
perceptions of crime opportunities. Specifically, this paper's central
6
purpose is to cast deterrence research findings in theoretical terms,
making them relevant for developing laws and social programs that
can be effective in reducing the incidence and prevalence of preda7
tory crime.
II.
A.

THE DETERRENCE RESEARCH LITERATURE

OVERVIEW

Essentially, the deterrence doctrine is premised on the notion
that criminal sanctions are the "penalty" or "cost" a convicted offender pays for crime.8 Variations in perspectives and in measurement techniques notwithstanding, all deterrence research and
theory is based on implicit or explicit assumptions about normative
systems that value rewards and disvalue punishments. 9 Deterrence
research and theory also makes assumptions about the ability and
3 Short & Meier, Criminology and the Study of Deviance, in THE STATE OF SOCIOLOGY 182

(J.Short ed. 1981).

4 See Williams, Deterrence and Social Control. Rethinking the Relationship, 13 J. CRIM.
JUST. 141, 148 (1985).

5 Conventionally, general deterrence refers to using legal threats to discourage
crime by members of the general population, whereas specific deterrence refers to using
legal sanctions to reduce the likelihood of recidivistic behavior.
6 Chen & Rossi, Evaluatingwith Sense: The Theory Driven Approach, 7 EVALUATION REV.
283, 285 (1983).
7 SeeJ.Q.WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (rev. ed. 1985). Wilson, an observer of
crime and other urban problems, argues that policy analysis should guide the develop-

ment of crime control programs. Id. at 48-56. He argues that the more valid theories of
crime causation yield no policy relevant variables. Id. at 207-09. The position taken
here is akin to Wilson's, in that we argue policies must be theory driven, for policies to
work in controlling socially intolerable behaviors.
8 As discussed in the following section of this paper, this premise is a serious flaw in
present deterrence theories. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
9 See J.Q.WILSON, supra note 7, at 252-53.
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motivation of the social actor to calculate the costs and benefits of
crime. 10 Furthermore, criminal sanctions, which are established by
legislatures, must be communicated by the media and imposed by
the courts. Thus, the deterrence doctrine is further based on the
assumption that individuals are actually aware of criminal sanctions."l Finally, the deterrence doctrine assumes that the social actor is discouraged from committing crime when the perceived threat
of punishment, or the cost of crime, exceeds any benefit associated
12
with the commission of an illegal act.
The United States witnessed an unprecendented wave of sentencing reform legislation in the 1970s, arguably due to the demise
of the rehabilitative justification for prison sentences, a perceived
increase in predatory crime and a growing awareness of disparity in
criminal sanctions. 13 As a result of this sentencing reform movement, many states legislated the deterrence doctrine into practice
based on the central premise that stiff punishments can help reduce
the extent of common or predatory crime. 14 Considerable controversy, however, surrounds the effectiveness of deterrence oriented
sentencing laws. Some evaluation researchers contend that the justification for deterrence based punishments should not be based exclusively on existing empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness
of the deterrence doctrine. 15 Supporters of the deterrence doctrine,
however, contend that the jury is still out: only when the main elements of the deterrence calculus can be conceptualized and appropriately measured can society assess the utility of using punishment
6
and threats of punishment to effect the crime problem.'
In search of empirically sound methods for crime control, some
of the nation's leading social scientists have investigated the effectiveness of deterrence oriented punishments. A comprehensive review of the relevant research literature 17 indicates that researchers
10 See F.

ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CON224-31 (1973).
11 See id. at 141-49, 296.
12 See id. at 245-48.

TROL

13 SeeJ. HAGAN, CRIME, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, AND ITS CONTROL 306-15 (1985).
14 See, e.g., J. WRIGHT, P. Rossi & K. DALY, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND

VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 273-308 (1983).
15 See J. GIBBS, NORMS, DEVIANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL: CONCEPTUAL MATTERS
(1981); H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER 109 (1982); Heumann & Loftin,
Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: the Michigan Felony Firearm Statute,
13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 393 (1979); Loftin & McDowall, The Deterrent Effects of the Florida
Felony FirearmsLaw, 7 5 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250 (1984).
16 See, e.g., J.Q. WILSON, supra note 7, at 117-44.
17 Deterrence research has been conducted by academicians within the disciplines of
political science, sociology, and psychology. See DiChiara & Galliher, Thirty Years of De-
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have raised three main questions concerning the deterrence doctrine. First, what is the salience of punishment certainty, severity,
and celerity? Second, what is the appropriate unit of analysis for
deterrence research? Third, what is the role of financial gain in the
deterrence calculus? The theoretical as well as epistemological insights that result from the debates surrounding these questions are
crucial for developing deterrence based and theory driven crime
control programs.
B.

THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF PUNISHMENT

The first question concerning the effectiveness of punishment
as a deterrent has centered on determining the importance of punishment severity, certainty and celerity in the deterrence calculus.
Research measuring the certainty of punishment as a deterrent effect, as well as research measuring the strength of the various
dimensions of punishment on criminal decisions,1 8 suggest that
punishment certainty has the greater influence on behavior.' 9
Zimring and Hawkins, writing one of the most fully articulated
theoretical statements on deterrence, explain these findings regarding the importance of punishment certainty. 20 They recognize that
deterrence is a future oriented principle. 2 1 Social actors, possessing
a consciousness that reaches into the future, operate in the present
time and are somewhat influenced by prior experiences. 22 Although
the future oriented social actor can imagine the effects of punishment (unless the actor has experienced prison), it is his (her) perception of the odds of getting convicted and punished for a crime
that will have the greatest influence in determining his (her) decision whether or not to commit a crime. 2 3 Empirically, the proposition that punishment certainty is the most crucial dimension for
terrence Research, 8 CONTEMP. CRISES 243 (1984), for a discussion of the contributions
from the distinct disciplines.
18 See Anderson, Harris & Miller, Models of Deterrence Theory, 12 Soc. Sc. RES. 236,
248 (1983); Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 515 (1968); Hollinger & Clark, Deterrencein the Workplace: PerceivedCertainty, PerceivedSeverity, and Emplokyee
Theft, 62 Soc. FORCES 398, 402-03 (1983); Tittle & Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and Crime

Rates: A Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455 (1974).
19 See Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effect of Arrestfor Domestic Assault, 49 AM.
Soc. REv. 261, 269-70 (1984); Wolpin, An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in
Englandand Wales 1894-1967, 86J. POL. ECON. 815, 819-20 (1978).
20 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 158-73.
21 Id. at 77-83.
22 Id. at 84-87.
23 Id. See Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effect of Arrestfor Domestic Assault, 49
Am. Soc. REv. 261 (1984).
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discouraging crime has been observed, 24 and, theoretically, this
proposition can be explained.
C.

THE APPROPRIATE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

The second question found throughout the deterrence literature is a methodological or an epistemological one regarding the
appropriate unit of analysis for deterrence research. Some investigators have used crime rates as dependent variables, generally
within a comparative framework, to examine the effectiveness of certain laws within certain jurisdictions. 25 Essentially, these researchers posit that aggregated arrest or conviction data summarize a
generalized effect of punishmnent on criminal behavior across
individuals .26
Conversely, other investigators view the individual social actor
as the only appropriate unit of analysis. 2 7 Theoretical work on decision making and information integration 28 makes the individual unit
of analysis position espoused by some deterrence researchers the
more reasonable one. This work shows that individual social actors,
when making decisions, estimate and integrate subjectively perceived rewards and punishments associated with possible behaviors. 29 According to this approach, each individual must calculate
the risk of apprehension and punishment when encountering a
crime opportunity. This calculation requires an individual level decision making process that cannot be reflected by aggregated data.
D.

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL GAIN IN DETERRENCE

30
The third question, cogently summarized by James Q. Wilson,
concerns the role of perceived gain in the criminal decision. Many
24 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 84-87.
25 See, e.g., Chilton, Analyzing Urban Crime Data: Deterrence and the Limitations of Arrests

Per Offense Ratios, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 590, 605 (1982); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397, 398-417 (1975); Waldo &
Chiricos, Perceived Penal Sanction and Self Reported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to Deterrence Research, 19 Soc. PROBS. 522 (1972).
26 See Chilton, supra note 25.
27 See C.R. TITTLE, supra note 2, at 225; Erickson, Gibbs &Jensen, The DeterrenceDoctrine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 305, 306 (1979);
Montmarquette & Nerlove, Deterrence and Delinquency: An Analysis of Individual Data, 1 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 37, 39 (1985).
28 See L. OFSHE & R. OFSHE, UTILITY AND CHOICE IN SOCIAL INTERACTION 89 (1970);
Anderson, Information and Integration Theory: A Brief Survey, in MEASUREMENT, PSYCHOPHYSICS, AND NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING (D. Kranis ed. 1974); Tversky, Additivity,
Utility, and Subjective Probability, 4J. OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 175 (1967).
29 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
30 See J.Q. WILSON, supra note 7. See also J.Q. WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND
HUMAN NATURE

44 (1985).
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deterrence researchers ignore individual perceptions of financial reward because gain (or reward) is considered to be external to the
legal and normative system that metes out punishment. 3 ' Nevertheless, the possibility of reward certainly influences criminal conduct.
How do the individual's perceptions of gain-financial gain from illegal as well as from legal activities-influence perceptions regarding punishment certainty and punishment severity in the decision to
avoid or approach crime opportunities? Logically, if punishment
discourages crime, the potential for illicit economic gain encourages
crime. Moreover, if the gain from crime mitigates the threat of punishment, legal opportunities for financial gain can discount the value
of the financial reward from crime.3 2 In developing theoretically
based deterrence laws and policies, the role of perceived legal and
illegal economic rewards cannot be ignored.
III.
A.

CONCEPTUAL FLAWS

OVERVIEW

To refine the existing deterrence doctrine, integration of the
empirical and theoretical contributions from the earlier works discussed above is necessary. It is also necessary to rid the doctrine of
two crucial flaws: 1) the conceptual failure to distinguish between
normative consensus and the influence of crime and punishment
norms on behavior, perceptions and decision making; and 2) the
mistaken view that criminal sanctions, especially the prison sentence, are the only calculable and potential penalties or costs associated with crime.
B.

NORMATIVE SYSTEMS

Weber argued that the rules governing social behavior tell actors what "is" empirically and what "ought to be" vis-a-vis their normative dimension.3 3 Consider, for example, the rule "do not steal."
This rule empirically reflects the notion that stealing can result in
punishment. The rule also indicates that one ought to avoid stealing, a socially disvalued behavior.
31 See I. PILIAVIN &

R.

GARTNER, THE IMPACT OF SUPPORTED WORK ON Ex-OFFEND-

ERS-2 THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SUPPORTED WORK DEMONSTRATION 88-92 (1981).
32 As Wilson argues, select social programs, such as the Supported Work Program,

improve opportunities for legitimately earned income and thus must be viewed as deterrence oriented programs.J.Q. WILSON, supra note 7. See I. PILIAVIN & R. GARTNER, THE
IMPACT OF SUPPORTED WORK ON Ex-OFFENDERS-VOLUME 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SUPPORTED WORK DEMONSTRATION (1981).
33 Weber, R. Stammler's Surmountingof the MaterialistConception of History, 3 BRIT.J.L. &

Soc'y 17 (M. Albrow trans. 1976).

MILLER AND ANDERSON

[Vol. 77

Normative systems contain explicit and implicit rules for behavior as well as criteria for distinguishing the rewards from the punishments associated with social life. Laws emanate from codified
normative rules that exist within a specific institution of coercion
(the courts) and are thus analytically distinct from rules of convention. Other norms dominate the behavior and perceptions of social
actors due to normative consensus, i.e., widespread agreement
within a community over the legitimacy of those norms. Normative
consensus, Weber argued, results from a plurality of social factors
34
habitually and subjectively experiencing actions guided by rules.
If one considers normative consensus to be a form of legitimate
domination, then the empirical distribution of known predatory
criminals implies that segments of the general population are differentially likely to subscribe to or dissent from popular norms. 3 5 Several factors, including variation in the knowledge of norms,
perceptions of fairness, and socioeconomic status, are arguably partial explanations for dissensus over normative systems that provide
the rules and guidelines for appraising criminal and noncriminal
36
opportunities.
The deterrence doctrine is flawed by its failure to account for
the distinction between the extent of normative consensus and differences in the degree to which social beings act according to the
dictates of existing norms. As a result, one can conclude that deterrence oriented laws accept as nonproblematic normative consensus,
especially with respect to disvaluing criminal sanctions.
Are select segments of the general population less likely to subscribe to a normative system that makes crime highly disvalued behavior? Or, generally, does consensus chartacterize the views held
by the population regarding crime and its punishments? Surely, no
deterrence based law can be effective unless it is directed toward the
appropriate normative system or systems that make the criminal
sanction a threat worth avoiding.
B.

THE PENAL SANCTION

The second major flaw associated with contemporary variants
of the deterrence doctrine is the conceptualization of the penal
34 M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
35 Several sources of data clearly show that young, poor, minority men are disproportionately arrested for predatory crime. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1985, at 416-22 (1986).

36 Hagan & Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of CriminalInjustice in America, 88
AM. J. Soc. 329, 333-39 (1982); Hamilton & Rytina, Social Consensus in Norms ofJustice:
Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 85 AM. J. Soc. 1117, 1122-24 (1980).
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sanction as the exclusive "cost" or "penalty" associated with crime.
In a capitalist economy, the financial cost to the offender of a term
in prison or jail can be estimated easily, and the resulting measure
of foregone personal income can be used to convince potential law
breakers that "crime does not pay." The rational actor who balances the perceived probable cost of crime against the probable
gain should be twice as deterred by the threat of a two year prison
sentence than by the threat of a one year sentence.3 7 Thus, according to this economic conceptualization, the courts should impose
stiffer penalties to deter more crime. Our contention, however, is
that the prison term cannot be measured only in terms of financial
costs; instead it must be measured as a multi-dimensional and extreme form of punishment.
In a bygone era, the sack of ashes (albeit perhaps an apocryphal
sack) symbolized the community's denunciation of sins and sinners.
Contemporarily, penal sanctions given by trial courts symbolize the
distinction between the serious criminal offense and all other forms
of illicit or deviant behavior in the United States. The states' penal
codes specify which are the serious criminal offenses deserving a
term of incarceration and which are the relatively trivial offenses deserving a monetary fine.3 8 Thus, punishments are not limited to the
"penalties" paid or the "costs" incurred by criminal offenders.
Convicted felony offenders, as well as serious misdemeanor offenders, are sentenced to "serve" punishments-typically a term of probation or incarceration in prison. Since punishments can be served
as well as paid, perceptions of punishment severity cannot be measured in terms of affordability. Punishment severity must be conceptualized in terms of deprivations. The offender punished by the
court with a term of incarceration is deprived of liberty, autonomy
and certain civil rights.3 9
Accurate conceptions of punishment severity perceptions must
also incorporate views of the symbolic and stigmatizing function of
the penal sanction. Symbolically, the second phase of a bifurcated
37 This illustration can be modified by introducing the notion of marginal disutility to
the dimension of punishment severity, suggesting that a two year term of incarceration
might be perceived as less than twice as severe as a one year term. Regardless, the
relevant issue here is that the penal sanction is not amenable to quantification with an
economic metric.
38 In the state of Indiana, for example, an offender convicted of a CLASS C misdemeanor "may be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than sixty (60) days; in addition, he may be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500)." IND. CODE § 35-50-34 (West 1986). The offender convicted of CLASS A felony "shall be imprisoned for a
fixed term of thirty (30) years." IND. CODE § 35-50-2-4 (West 1986).
39 SeeJ. INCIARDI, CRIMINALJUSTICE 662 (1984).

426

MILLER AND ANDERSON

[Vol. 77

criminal trial-the sentencing hearing-is an institutionalized degradation ceremony where the impartial judge, in the name of public
values, denounces the offender by either removing the offender
from the community, or restricting his (her) freedom according to
40
the probation contract.
The conceptual flaw of treating the penal sanction as only the
"cost" of crime has severe implications for the deterrence doctrine.
If perceptions of punishment severity extend the boundaries of financial estimations, criminal law that protracts the prison term for
the purpose of deterrence cannot be effective, nor can it be a cost
efficient method for controlling the crime problem.
IV.
A.

A

STUDY OF ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED CRIME OPPORTUNITIES

OVERVIEW

The data for this research is the product of our study funded by
the National Institute ofJustice to develop appropriate measures for
observing perceptions of individuals encountering hypothetical
crime opportunities. 4 1 The study is designed to reflect the three
major contributions to the deterrence research tradition discussed
above. First, it measures the importance of punishment certainty
and punishment severity in perceptions of crime opportunities. Second, the individual's judgment is the unit of measurement. Third,
the study measures both the perceived disutility of the criminal
sanction as well as the perceived utility of financial gain from
42
crime.
B.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS

Unlike most deterrence research, in this study respondents are
members of the general public rather than convicted or incarcerated
offenders. The purpose of the study is to explicate the deterrence
calculus. Thus, this study models the perceived probability of committing economically motivated crimes for those individuals who are
apparently responsive to legal threats. As such, it permits an investigation of differences in the extent to which individuals subscribe to
the normative system that determines the value of criminal gain and
the disvalue of criminal sanctions.
A purposive sample of survey respondents is created to reflect
40
41

Garfinkel, Conditions of a Successful DegradationCeremony, 61 AM. J. Soc. 420 (1956).
For additional information on the study see Anderson, Harris & Miller, supra note

18.
42 This study is informed by the subjective expected utility perspective of decision
making. See L. OFSHE & R. OFSHE, supra note 28, at 11-20.
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roughly the empirical relationships between predatory crime arrest
data and the offender personal background characteristics of age,
gender, family income and race. 43 A total of 751 individuals in the
crime prone age groups (age fifteen to thirty-six) participated in a
factorial survey study conducted in 1982 in Baltimore. Proportionate to their representation in the general population, women are undersampled and blacks are oversampled. In total, 347 white men,
173 white women, 154 black men and 77 black women are surveyed.
Twenty percent of the sample falls close to the Social Security Ad44
ministration's definition of poor households in the United States.
Respondents were given booklets containing fifty vignettes.
Each vignette describes a potential crime opportunity in terms of
the nature of the offense, the possible economic gain from the
crime, the risk of being caught and convicted of the crime and the
punishment. We express the punishment that would result from
conviction in terms of prison time and fines. 4 5 Figure 1 is an example of the crime opportunity vignettes used in the study. Respondents indicate on the rating line following each vignette how likely
someone like themselves would be to commit the hypothetical crime
under the circumstances described in the vignette. Therefore, the
dependent measure is the perceived probability of a criminal
decision.
The factorial survey design that we use combines the benefits of
a controlled experiment with those associated with survey research.
Factorial objects, i.e., the individual vignettes, are constructed to
model experimental conditions, and an adequate sample of the population being studied is selected to respond to the vignette booklets. 4 6 In this study, a total of 37,750 crime opportunity vignettes
are rated (751 respondents X 50 factorial objects each).
To construct vignettes, a computer program randomly assigns
values for all of the dimensions of information appearing in the vignettes. Thus, factorial objects are analogous to iterations under
43 These data can be found in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 416-22.
44 The 1981 Social Security Administration poverty index was used to define poverty
thresholds for the 200 interviews of individuals whose household income put them at or
below a point equal to 150% of the "poverty line." The poverty index takes into account household size. Thus, a one person household is within 150% of the poverty level
at $7,065 and a five person household is within 150% of the poverty level at $16,425
gross annual 1981 income.
45 The research discussed here was also concerned with three non-economic crimes:
carrying a handgun illegally, smoking marijuana, and assault. Those three crimes are
not discussed in this paper.
46 See MEASURING SOCIALJUDGMENTS: THE FACTORIAL SURVEY APPROACH (P. Rossi &

S. Nock eds. 1982).
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FIGURE 1
EXAMPLE OF CRIME OPPORTUNITY VIGNETTE
THE CRIME YOU HAVE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT IS:

LYING ON INCOME TAX REPORT

IF YOU GET AWAY WITH IT THE
GAIN WILL BE:

$5,000 GAIN

THE CHANCE OF GETTING CAUGHT
AND CONVICTED IS:
THE PENALTY IF CAUGHT AND
CONVICTED IS:

40% CHANCE OF BEING CAUGHT
AND CONVICTED
6 MONTHS IN JAIL
AND
$500 FINE

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT YOU WOULD
COMMIT THE CRIME?
0% "10%'20%'30%'40% 50% 60%o 70% 80% 90% 100%
ABSOLUTELY
WOULD NOT
COMMIT CRIME

ABSOLUTELY
WOULD
COMMIT CRIME

experimental conditions. For this research, five dimensions of information are rotated: 1) Type of Crime, 2) Risk, 3) Prison, 4) Fine
and 5) Gain. Note that Risk is a measure of punishment certainty,
whereas Prison and Fine are measures of punishment severity. Table 1 shows the levels for the five dimensions of the hypothetical
crime opportunity vignettes.
By design, factorial surveys generate asymptotically orthogonal
variables, making them ideal for using an Ordinary Least Squares
(O.L.S.) analytical approach 4 7 to observe how various dimensions of
information are weighted and integrated by respondents when
forming judgments abvout social objects. 48 The initial data file analyzed in this research contains 37,750 cases of information. Each
case contains coded values for the five vignette dimensions under
investigation, the respondent's perceived probability of a criminal
decision and the respondent's background characteristics, which are
obtained from an interview following the vignette rating task.
C.

THE DETERRENCE CALCULUS

As discussed above, one primary purpose of the crime opportuJ. JACKSON, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 45-65
KLEINBAUM & L. KUPPER, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND OTHER MULTIVARIATE METHODS 131-57 (1978).
47 E. HANUSHEK &

(1977); D.

48 For a general description of using factorial objects, see Rossi & Anderson, The
FactorialSurvey Approach, in MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: THE FACTORIAL SURVEY APPROACII, supra note 46, at 1.
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TABLE 1
VIGNETTE DIMENSIONS AND LEVELS
TYPE OF CRIME*

RISK

Armed Robbery

0

Purse Snatching

5

PRISON

0

FINE

GAIN

0

5

100

25

.5

200

50

Probation**

Tax Evasion

10

Stealing from Store

20

1

400

100

Selling Heroin

30

2

600

250

Selling Marijuana

40

4

800

500

Embezzlement

50

6

1,000

750

60

8

2,000

1,000

70

10

4,000

2,000

80
90
100

15
20
25

6,000
8,000
10,000

4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
75,000
100,000

*

Three non-economic crimes were also used, but they are not discussed in this paper.

**

For the data examined here, probation was arbitrarily coded as .25 years.

nity study is to reflect the knowledge gained from earlier deterrence
research in an attempt to model the deterrence calculus that characterizes individuals of the general public. Considering the distribution of known criminal incidents in the United States, a single
equation linear additive model, modified to include a block of
dummy variables to represent the Crime Type dimension, was used
initially in the analysis designed to explain variance in the vignette
ratings made by white males, white females, black males and black
females. 4 9 Subsequent analysis using a logarithmic model produces
a significant improvement over the linear model in R2 values for the
four gender by race subsamples. The error term (1-R2 ), however,
remained large for all subsamples, with the specified model being
the most successful in explaining variance in white male vignette
ratings.
4) See Anderson, Harris & Miller, Models of Delerrence Theoy, 12 Soc. Sci. RES. 236,
245 (1983).
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The findings, partly summarized in Table 2, represent at the
subsample unit of analysis the perceived probability of criminal deTABLE 2
LINEAR MODEL REGRESSIONS SUBSAMPLE UNIT OF ANALYSIS
VIGNETTE

DIMENSION

WHITE MALES

WHITE FEMALES

13(c3)

13((r13)
.215**
(.011)
-.347**
(.009)
-. 363**
(.092)
-. 603**
(.037)

GAIN'

.284**
(.008)

Risx

-. 396"*

FINE
PRISON

(.007)
-. 489**
(.065)
-. 640**
(.027)

BLACK MALES

13 (13)
.249**
(.013)
-. 245**
(.011)
-. 327**
(.108)
-. 464**
(.045)

BLACK FEMALES

13(ar13)
.155**

(.018)
-.188**
(.015)
-.467**
(.145)
-. 312**
(.060)

Crime Typeb
Purse Snatching
Tax Evasion
Steal from Store
Sell Marijuana
Sell Heroin
Embezzlement
Intercept

RN

(N)

1.565*
(.794)
1.703*
(.807)
1.304
(.795)
6.050**

(.802)
.799
(.807)
.142
(.835)
47.114
.244**
17,347

1.092
(1.102)
2.584*
(1.119)
2.386*
(1.125)
4.667**
(1.106)
.432
(1.105)
1.252
(1.108)
43.910
.197**
8,649

.796
(1.305)
2.518
(1.304)
2.204
(1.314)
7.631*
(1.329)
-. 842

(1.318)
3.17 1*
(1.305)
38.360
.117**
7,620

2.440
(1.794)
4.495*
(1.805)
5.589**
(1.791)
8.992**
(1.817)
2.392
(1.772)
7.322**
(1.795)
28.306
.078**
3,836

* p less than .05
** p less than .01

The Gain and Fine coefficients have been multiplied by 1,000 and reflect the
expected change in the vignette rating given a $1,000 increase in Gain or Fine net of
other variables.
Armed Robbery is the omitted category in a block of dummy variables to represent
crime type.

cisions as a function of crime type,5 0 economic gain, risk, fine,
prison term and random error. Based on the subsample unit of
analysis, it is clear that perceived criminal choices or decisions can
50 Seven different crime descriptions were rotated in vignettes in order to give re-

spondents different crime scenarios tojudge. The net effects of the various crime stems
are not discussed in this paper.
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be modeled. The partial regression coefficients representing the
net effects of the vignette dimensions are statistically significant and
in the predicted directions. As the gain from the hypothetical crime
opportunity increases, the perceived probability of committing a
crime increases. Likewise, as the certainity and severity of punishment increases, the perceived probability of illegal behavior
decreases.
Based on the subsample unit of analysis, one could infer that
white men, compared to the other gender by race segments of the
population, are more likely to balance the cost of crime against the
potential gain from crime when making decisions to approach or
avoid criminal opportunities. Such an inference would permit the
conclusion that the threat of severe sanctions best deters white men.
The analysis described above also suggests that aggregating the
vignette ratings to the subsample unit of analysis can mask the structure of the individual's decision calculus. This approach could result in a misrepresentation of the degree to which the perceived
probability of committing crimes is influenced by a consideration of
the benefits and costs associated with criminal behavior for white
males, white females, black males and black females. In other
words, it is possible that the "within group" differences in the decision making calculus vary across the four gender by race segments
of the general population. If "within group" differences vary considerably, the relatively high R2 value for white males at the subsample unit of analysis would imply only that the individual white male
is less likely than the individual black male, the individual black female or the individual white female to deviate from the values and
norms governing white male perceptions.
One major purpose of this study is to examine individuals' differential subscription to normative systems that can influence the
criminal decision. Thus, it is necessary to examine the individual
respondent's calculus for balancing the perceived disvalue of punishment against the perceived value of gain.
D.

THE INDIVIDUAL UNIT OF ANALYSIS

A crucial benefit of the factorial survey design is that it places
no restrictions on the unit of aggregation for analysis. All vignette
ratings can be pooled and analyzed together; subsamples of ratings
can be analyzed separately (as discussed above); or the individual's
vignette ratings can be analyzed. For this particular research, the
individual respondent's decision making calculus is modeled in order to obtain the best representation of how the gender by race seg-
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ments of the general population tend to value and disvalue the
benefits and costs of crime when faced with criminal opportunities.
To explain variance in criminal opportunity judgments at the
respondent unit of analysis, one functional form of an equation is
specified for 751 separate O.L.S. analyses of vignette ratings. The
final estimated function is of the form:
Y = 3o + 31 loge G + 321og, P + 133R + J34F + M3Di + e,
where f30 is the constant and I3k is the partial regression coefficient of
the kth vignette variable. The meanings of the other terms are given
below:
loge G = Natural Logarithm of Gain in Dollars
loge P = Natural Logarithm of Prison Time in Years
R
= Risk on a 0 - 100 Scale
F
- Fine in Dollars
D
= 0 - 1 Crime Dummies with Tax Evasion Omitted
E
= Stochastic Error Term with Usual O.L.S. Assumptions
Y
= Perceived Probability of Crime on a 0 - 100 Scale.
We used the single equation model to generate the respondent unit
of analysis data. Each case in this particular data file contains the
respondent's partial regression coefficients, the multiple R2 value
from the full equation, the mean vignette rating and the numerical
values that represent such personal background characteristics as
age, gender, race, income and level of education.
E.

GENERAL RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

A major conceptual flaw associated with popular variations of
the deterrence doctrine is the implicit acceptance of widespread
consensus over normative systems that make the penal sanction an
especially disvalued punishment. This research, however, takes
consensus as problematic. It examines perceptions about hypothetical crime opportunities based on the premise that meaningful segments of the general public may indeed subscribe to distinctive
norms that guide their perceptions.
This study is principally concerned with crime opportunity
norms that characterize the gender and race segments of the general population. We choose to focus on these particular segments
because they show extreme and obvious differences in their proximity to crime and the criminal justice system. 5 1
51 Major differences in crime opportunity judgments would be predicted among the
age strata, occupational groups, and so forth.
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THE PROXIMITY PROBLEM

In terms of gender and race, the empirical picture shows that
males and blacks are more likely than females and whites to be arrested for crimes or victimized by predatory offenses. 5 2 Additional
indicators such as the composition of the prison populations 53 or
offenders shot by police 54 reaffirm the notion that males, especially
black males, are disproportionately represented within the criminal
justice populations. The probabilities of predatory crime victimization, arrest and incarceration summarize an objective proximity to
crime and the criminal justice process. Quite clearly, the race and
gender segments are not equally proximite to crime and the criminal justice system at an objective level.
Moreover, there is some evidence for suggesting that the gender and race segments of the general population are not equally
proximate to crime and the criminal justice system at the subjective
level. A concern over crime, a fear of being victimized by violent
crime, and perceptions of fairness in criminal justice can be used to
summarize a subjective proximity to crime and criminal justice.
Some researchers have found that females and blacks fear crime
more than males and whites. 5 5 Others have found that blacks per56
ceive more injustice than whites in the legal response to crime.
G.

EXPECTED PATTERNS OF RACE AND GENDER DIFFERENCE

Premised on: 1) an expectation of a lack of normative consensus due to variations in objective and subjective proximity to crime
and criminal justice, and 2) the salience of financial gain, punishment severity, and punishment certainity in the deterrence calculus,
the following gender and race patterns are expected when examining perceptions of crime opportunities at the respondent unit of
analysis.
(1) Compared to males, females are expected to indicate a lower
perceived probability of committing economically motivated crime.
52 See

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RE-

PORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE 4

(1985).

53 Bureau ofjustice Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1985,
at 4 (1986). See Christianson, Our Black Prisons, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND

BLACKS 259 (D. Georges-Aveyie ed. 1984).
54 Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 707
(1982); Geller & Karales, Shootings of and by Chicago Police: U'ncommnon arises, 72J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1813 (1981).
55 Liska, Lawrence & Sanchirico, Fear of Crime as a Social Fact, 60 Soc. FORCES 760,
762 (1982); Warr & Stafford, Fear of Victimization: .4 Look at the Proximate Canses, 61 Soc.
FORCES 1033, 1040-41 (1983).
56 See supra note 36.
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(2) The average black male deterrence calculus is expected to be
as structured as the average white male calculus, when measured by
respondent level R2 values.
(3) Norms for disvaluing punishment and for valuing gain, as they
are represented by respondent level partial regression coefficients
that model the deterrence calculus, are expected to vary across gender by race segments of the general population.
(4) The Gain, Risk and Prison vignette dimensions are expected to
be weighted more heavily by males than by females.
(5) Regardless of gender and race, Prison and Fine measures of
crime severity are expected to be less important in the deterrence
calculus than Gain or Risk.
V.
A.

FINDINGS

SUMMARY MEASURES

Table 3 shows the gender by race distributions of two summary
measures derived from the respondent unit of analysis examination
TABLE 3
SUMMARY MEASURES
(A)

MEAN RATINGS -Judgment Tendencies

Respondent Group
White Males
(N=346)
White Females (N= 172)
Black Males
(N= 151)
Black Females
(N=77)
(B)

EXPLAINED VARIANCES -

X
29.505
28.296
27.659
23.094

14.523
15.854
18.185
18.143

Degree of Structure in Judgments

Respondent Group

X

a

White Males
(N=346)
White Females (N= 172)
Black Males
(N=151)
Black Females
(N=77)

.580
.561
.555
.588

.172
.153
.187
.165

of vignette ratings. The respondent level mean vignette rating, displayed in the top panel of Table 3, is called the rating tendency and
represents the overall perceived probability of committing economically motivated crimes. Separate variance estimates are used to
identify statistically significant differences across pairs of mean rating tendencies. As expected, this analysis shows that the mean of
the black female vignette rating tendency is substantially and significantly lower than either the mean of the white male or the black
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male rating tendency. These data imply that, on average, black women perceive a lesser likelihood of committing crime than men.
These data, however, quite unexpectedly suggest that white women, faced with what are considered the "right circumstances" for
committing crime, perceive that they are as likely as males to take
57
advantage of a criminal opportunity. In the past decade, Simon
and Adler 58 among other criminologists predicted dramatic increases in the number of women in the arrest data. 59 Contrary to
those predictions, no factual data indicate that women today are
committing more serious crimes than they have in the past. 60 This
study, however, suggests that some white women are experiencing
at a subjective level a greater likelihood of committing crime than
we anticipated.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the distribution of respondent level multiple R2 values from the individual respondent level of
analysis. The multiple R2 values represent the degree to which the
single equation used to model the respondents' perceived likelihood
of criminal decisions summarizes the vignette dimension effects. As
expected, but contrary to what a subsample level of analysis implies
(see Table 2), there are no significant differences across the gender
and race segments regarding the degree to which perceived criminal
decisions are structured by the weighting and integrating of dimensions of information appearing in the vignettes.
When examining the standard deviations of the distributions of
respondent R 2 values, one must note, however, that the values for
black males and females are more dispersed than those for white
males and females. The standard deviations suggest that to adequately represent black perceptions of crime opportunities, the
black individual'sperceptions must be analyzed. A subsample unit of
analysis may only be appropriate for representing limited segments
of the general population, i.e., those more likely to show consensus
in judgments.
B.

NORMS GOVERNING PERCEPTIONS OF GAIN AND PUNISHMENT

Table 4 displays the gender by race distributions of the respondent level partial regression coefficients representing the net influences of Gain, Risk, Prison and Fine on the perceived probability of
criminal decisions. The partial regression coefficients essentially re57 R.

SIMON, WOMEN AND GRIME 105-10 (1975).
58 F. ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMINAL (1975).
59 Id. at 250; R. SIMON, supra note 57, at 48.
60 C. MANN, FEMALE CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

15-20 (1984); Steffensmier, Sex dzjfer-

ences in Patternsof Adult Crime 1965-1977, 58 Soc. FORCES 1080, 1092 (1980).
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TABLE 4
MEAN STATISTICS FROM INDIVIDUAL LEVEL REGRESSIONS
VIGNETTE DIMENSION

WHITE MALES

R(o)

WHITE FEMALES

(a)

BLACK MALES

BLACK FEMALES

R (r)

R (a)

Log Gain

3.585
(2.516)

3.059
(2.250)

3.062
(2.758)

2.289
(2.895)

Risk

-. 398
(.259)

-. 356
(.243)

-. 254
(.311)

-. 192
(.288)

-1.802
(1.768)

-1.420
(1.565)

-1.096
(1.734)

-. 890
(1.890)

-. 046
(.099)

-. 039
(.095)

-. 038
(.105)

-. 032
(.103)

Log Prison
Fine in
Hundreds
(N)

346

172

151

77

flect the respondent's accepted norms for valuing the financial gain
from crime and for disvaluing the punishment associated with a
criminal conviction.
The statistics displayed in Table 4 show that, as expected, members of the gender and race segments of the general population
tend to subscribe to at least moderately different normative systems
that guide perceptions of economic crime opportunities. Moreover,
white men and black women appear to show the greatest differences
in subscription to norms for valuing the gain from crime and disvaluing the various dimensions of punishment for crime. Regardless of
the vignette dimension under consideration, the average white male
partial regression coefficient is substantially larger than the average
black female statistic.
C.

STRENGTH OF EFFECTS

This particular application of the factorial survey design permits a comparison across and within the gender by race segments of
the relative strengths of the vignette dimensions in a criminal decision calculus. When independent variables are orthogonal, as they
are by design in this research, the sum of the squared standardized
partial regression coefficients approximates the coefficient of determination. Thus, 3i/X13i 2 was used to estimate the strength of the
Risk, Prison, Gain and Fine dimensions. The resulting gender by
race distributions of strength measures are displayed in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
RELATIVE STRENGTH OF VIGNETTE DIMENSIONS*

DIMENSION

WHITE MALES

WHITE FEMALES

BLACK MALES

BLACK FEMALES

Gain
Prison

.326
.137

.239
.115

.280
.103

.256
.094

Risk
Fine

.529
.029

.395
.039

.285
.046

.258
.040

345

172

151

77

(N)
*

2

3i/X13i

The only finding congruent with expectations for race and gender differences in the weighting (or strength) of vignette dimensions
concerns the average net effect of financial gain. Men, especially
white men, are more strongly influenced than black men or black
women by the punishment dimensions of certainty and severity
(Risk and Prison) when judging crime scenarios.
Congruent with expectations for similarities in the deterrence
calculus, the four gender by race groups indicate that the certainty
of getting caught and convicted for a crime (Risk) has a stronger
effect than the dimensions of crime severity (Prison and Fine) in the
deterrence calculus. Morever, the financial gain from a hypothetical
crime appears to have a relatively strong influence on the crime opportunity judgments made by the typical respondent, regardless of
61
gender or race.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

The data analyzed in this research represent judgments about
hypothetical criminal situations or the perceived probabilities of
criminal decisions. How closely such judgments about social subjects correspond to behavior is a matter for speculation and empirical verification. What these data show and imply, however, with
respect to how survey respondents subjectively value and disvalue
the financial gain and the potential punishments associated with
crime opportunities are important for understanding how legal
61 AsJ. Kim and C. Mueller show, the magnitudes of the standardized partial regression coefficients are influenced in part by the variance in the independent variables, in
this research, a design effect. Kim & Mueller, Standardizedand UnstandardizedCoefficients in
Causal Analysis: An Expository Note, 4 Soc. METHODS & RES. 423 (1976). Thus, within
group comparisons of the strength of the different vignette dimensions must be interpreted with caution.
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threats can be used effectively to discourage common criminal
behavior.
Clearly this research shows that the threat of punishment is a
central and multi-dimensional factor of information processed by individuals faced with perceived economically motivated crime opportunities. Most importantly, these data suggest that predatory crime
control policies ought to focus on the certainty of punishment as the
primary means for discouraging illicit behaviors. Thus, increasing
the likelihood of a criminal conviction and criminal sanction is likely
to be more effective than lengthening prison sentences under a deterrence based punishment scheme.
For individuals faced with criminal opportunities, punishment
severity is more than an opportunity cost, i.e., foregone income. A
better understanding of perceptions regarding the deprivations and
stigmas associated with the penal sanction is needed before law
makers and policy makers can attempt to deter crime with punishment severity. This research indicates that, to be effective, predatory crime control programs must neutralize or discount the value
of financial gain from crime. Blocking criminal opportunities as well
as providing legal opportunities for financial gain should be incorporated into social programs that are designed to ameliorate the
predatory crime problem.
Deterrence based theory, law, and social policy cannot assume
normative consensus. This research found at least moderate dissensus across the gender by race segments of the general population
over normative guidelines for disvaluing the criminal sanction. Future theoretical and empirical work on the deterrence doctrine must
examine variations in perceptions of both the upside and the downside of criminal opportunities across meaningful segments of the
general population. Deterrence based laws or programs cannot be
fully effective until we learn why, for some individuals, prison is not
a threat worth avoiding.

